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Introduction
As the United States exited World War II a new global superpower, New 
Deal policies provided the nation with a wealth of infrastructural blessings 
like the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Hoover Dam and countless other 
projects that strengthened the nation’s functional backbone. The projects 
from the New Deal were the largest publicly funded infrastructure projects 
since the restructuring of so-called “U.S. routes” and once again confirmed 
the narrative that great improvements in efficiency, integration and national 
strength could be made through federal government initiatives. In the 
postwar era, Americans, more than ever, relied on the automobile for the 
transportation of goods and people, and the U.S. highways of the prewar 
era were unable to meet the growing demand (Urban Issues 121-124). As 
a result, the Eisenhower Administration pushed for and passed the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1956, otherwise known as the National Interstate and 
Defense Highways Act. The Highway Act of ‘56 was designed to alleviate 
congestion and to provide 41,000 miles of first-class highways, the most 
traveled of which were constructed in rapidly expanding metropolitan areas 
in order to provide transportation from suburban residences to downtown 
sites of employment. These highways cut across urban landscapes, carving up 
both space and place within American cities (Xiangming Chen 1-6). In effect, 
many of these highways served as concrete chokeholds, destroying inner-city 
communities and often isolating them from wealthier downtown districts 
(Urban Issues 121-124, Jacobs 127). 
 The top-down nature of the Interstate Highway Act meant that 
policymakers often proposed highways without taking into account the 
potential spatial and “placial” consequences of how and where freeways, exits, 
and interchanges were and were not built. As such, there are several pieces 
in the National Highway System – the term used for the combination of 
Interstates highways and U.S. routes – that cut across existing grains within 
urban landscapes. As a result, some urban scholars have stated that the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act has been the most harmful federal policy aimed 
at American cities. The highway’s attack on urban areas was detrimental in 
two important manners. First, it allowed for middle-class whites to flee from 
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declining urban cores to homogeneous suburban communities outside of the 
central city’s tax base. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, freeways 
became concrete barriers that divided cities, destroyed existing neighborhoods 
and brought tremendous amounts of auditory, visual and environmental 
pollution to urban communities. 
 Given the National Highway System’s harmful impact on cities during 
its construction and its first half-century of use, it is difficult to predict the 
consequences of allowing what was once the largest public works project in 
American history to decay. The majority of the nation’s interstate highways 
were built in the first twenty-five years after the act’s passage, but sufficient 
funding was not provided for the future maintenance of the roadways. 
Across the nation, freeways, exits, bridges and other aspects of the National 
Highway System are falling into disrepair (Urban Issues 118). Consequently, 
they will likely not survive as long as initially planned because of this lack 
of upkeep. In spite of these harsh realities, policymakers at both the state 
and federal levels continually fail to develop a sufficient mechanism for 
highway maintenance. While some federal funds are provided for highway 
repairs from a gasoline consumption tax, and while even more funds were 
provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the 
percentage of federal funds devoted to interstate infrastructure today is ten 
percent below its peak levels in the 1980s (Urban Issues 116). As a result, 
the fiscal onus has progressively fallen on the states; the percentage of state 
funds devoted to highway maintenance has steadily increased from its lowest 
years in the 1980s. As such, states commonly view highway maintenance as 
an unfunded mandate provision in the original 1956 act and its subsequent 
reauthorizations (Urban Issues 116). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, with 
the I-35 bridge collapse in Minneapolis, the focus on “shovel-ready projects” 
in the Stimulus Bill of 2009 and the partisan bickering within the 112th 
Congress over transportation appropriations, there are bright political and 
media spotlights on the nation’s aging infrastructure (Urban Issues 113-
114). In addition, President Obama recently gave a major speech pushing 
for economic legislation with a decaying Brent Spence Bridge on the Ohio 
River as his chosen backdrop (Kuhnhenn). As deterioration becomes an 
increasingly salient issue, policy actors at all levels of government will have 
to recognize the importance of providing significant funding to repair and 
replace highways across the nation, perhaps even reaching the 35 percent of 
federal expenditures allocated to infrastructure in the 1980s. Borrowing New 
Jersey sewerage director Robert Ville’s description, America’s 41,000 miles of 
highways are like “old cars with bad transmissions” (Urban Issues 127). Some 
might be better served by getting repaired, but others should be replaced 
rather than fixed (Urban Issues 127). 
 In the near future, the slow-growing disaster that is the nation’s highway 
system will get enough public and political attention to warrant significant 
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federal funding, more than the limited funds from the 2009 Stimulus 
Package. Therefore, policy actors at the local level need to research and 
develop plans now to make the new National Highway System more efficient, 
ensuring that its design will not cut against the existing grain of urban 
landscapes and communities. Policy actors must also have plans ready and 
must use a forward-looking approach so that the nation’s highways can be 
fixed and improved from both efficiency and integration standpoints. This 
strategy must also include obtaining local community input, since these 
highways have a large effect on urban and suburban neighborhoods. There 
are numerous ways to involve the community in determining the nature 
and placement of future highways, from open forums and town-hall style 
meetings to voting sessions. Considering that the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956 failed to include bottom-up input in what was a project mostly driven 
from the top-down, it is critical that this same exclusion does not occur again. 
 Ultimately, the existing state of American transportation infrastructure 
can be described by one word: decay. When it comes time to repair or replace 
highways in urban areas, policymakers must insure that they do not fall victim 
to the same mistakes and assumptions that their predecessors committed. 
Specifically, urban policy actors need to improve transportation infrastructure 
so that it is better integrated with surrounding landscapes and communities, 
so that it allows for more efficient movement of traffic in, around and 
through metropolitan areas, and so that adequate funds are provisioned for 
infrastructure maintenance.
Infrastructure Issues in the Hartford Context
Hartford, the capital city of Connecticut, provides an interesting case study 
for both examining the scars left by transportation infrastructure projects and 
for looking into the state of decay of the National Highway System. Hartford 
is a city of almost 125,000 people situated in the Connecticut River Valley in 
Southern New England. The city is home to two major interstate highways and 
trucking routes that funnel traffic between the New England region and the 
New York metropolitan area to the south. Interstate 91, a north-south highway 
extending from the Canadian border in Vermont to the Long Island Sound 
in New Haven, CT, cuts across the eastern portion of municipally defined 
Hartford, and runs parallel to the Connecticut River throughout the majority 
of its route through the state. Interstate 84, an east-west highway beginning 
in Scranton, PA and ending at the Massachusetts Turnpike in Sturbridge, 
MA, runs directly through the middle of municipally defined Hartford. From 
a spatial standpoint, I-84 runs through the western portion of the city on a 
viaduct (i.e., as an elevated highway) and cuts through the eastern portion 
of the city – through the prosperous downtown neighborhood – as a sunken 
highway and a tunnel-like section known as the “Yankee Expressway.” Turning 
to a placial description of the freeway, I-84 effectively separates the city’s 
poorer North End neighborhoods, home to the majority of the city’s African 
American and Afro-Caribbean population, from both the downtown area and 
the southern half of the capital city. In particular, the viaduct section of I-84 
serves as a visual and physical barrier between north and south. The viaduct 
itself is the fifth most heavily trafficked section of highway in the United States 
and is fast approaching the end of its lifetime due to the physical beating it 
has taken over the years (Painter 11). I-84 exits Hartford by crossing over the 
Bulkeley Bridge, a structure built at the turn of the century with the intention 
of carrying non-automobile traffic (Kurumi). The bridge’s initial design and 
construction emphasized strength and longevity over aesthetics, and it was 
deemed strong enough in the 1920s to carry US-6 and US-44 across the river. 
Later in the Interstate Highway era, the bridge was still considered structurally 
sound enough to carry I-84. These two interstates, well-traveled by city 
residents, metropolitan area commuters, thru-traffic and trucks, intersect just 
east of downtown Hartford near the Connecticut River in a tangled mess of on 
and off-ramps that creates an infrastructural concrete jungle on what could have 
been highly-demanded land between downtown and the riverfront. 
 While Hartford’s contemporary infrastructural lynchpins are aging, the city 
and its roadways bear the old scars of countless failed infrastructure projects – 
especially ring road proposals – that only add to the detrimental impact that 
the freeway era has had on the city and its residents. Highways like the Woods 
River Expressway (CT-189), I-284, the western half of I-291, I-491, and I-484 
all were all either proposed or partially started and later abandoned (Kurumi). 
As Hartford continued to grow at the beginning of the Interstate Highway era, 
policymakers estimated that the metropolitan region would reach two million 
people and planned an elaborate highway system to meet such a high level of 
expected travel. Those policymakers, at both state and federal levels, could never 
have imagined the full of deindustrialization and its detrimental effects on the 
region. The predicted rate of growth was far too ambitious, and the Hartford 
metropolitan area currently holds just under 1.2 million people (Wolfram 
Alpha). As a result, planners have abandoned highway projects once deemed 
necessities, sometimes during the early stages of their construction (Kurumi). 
Their remnants, signs of what could have been an efficient highway system 
typical of many other American cities of its size, instead form on/off ramps 
taking up tremendous tracts of land, underutilized bridges, and two interstate 
highways that carry more far more traffic than they should. In looking at the 
historical plans for Hartford’s freeways, one can find important lessons as 
to how future infrastructure projects should and should not be planned and 
how to better integrate the metropolitan area with its center (Painter 15-23). 
In addition, by looking at the consequences of existing freeway placement, 
policy actors can better formulate plans to improve, rather than simply repair, 
decaying infrastructure to make it more efficient and to more seamlessly 
integrate it with the surrounding area. There are two important ways these 
lessons can be applied to improve Hartford’s infrastructure in the future. First, 
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the city must renovate, rather than simply fix, the I-84 viaduct, and must turn its 
attention towards the aging Bulkeley Bridge. Secondly, the city and its suburbs 
must work together to provide strategically located ring roads around the city 
so as to better integrate the metropolitan area with the central city and to allow 
for the efficient deferment of thru-traffic and 91/84 interchange traffic to areas 
outside of downtown Hartford (Wolfram|Alpha).
Improving Hartford’s Decaying Infrastructure
In looking at the decaying nature of Hartford’s transportation infrastructure, 
two foci are evident – the Bulkeley Bridge and the I-84 viaduct – as candidates 
for immediate repair, renovation and improvement. The viaduct, one of the 
most traveled sections of highway in the entire nation, is both inefficient and 
poorly integrated into the surrounding urban landscapes and communities 
(Painter 15-23). While the Bulkeley Bridge – the longest stone arch bridge 
in the world – has dutifully served the city and the region since 1908, it was 
designed neither to last one hundred years nor to carry the tremendous amount 
of traffic it currently supports (Kurumi). While subsequent improvements have 
enabled the bridge to last as long as it did with such a difficult task, it is clear 
that this one-hundred-year-old structure should not be responsible for the lives 
of countless motorists and that I-84 should span the river on a new bridge as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, with advances in engineering and architecture, 
Hartford could replace the Bulkeley Bridge with a structure that is both durable 
and aesthetically pleasing. If Hartford is to consider itself a first-class city, then 
having infrastructure that embodies both qualities goes a long way towards 
solidifying that reputation. 
 When Hartford’s decaying and subpar infrastructure, the viaduct section of 
I-84 is and has always been of particular emphasis by policy actors from local 
to federal levels (Painter 1-5). The viaduct, an aging structure that divides the 
North End from the more prosperous southern half of the city and Downtown 
areas, is unsightly, and its congestion brings about tremendous amounts of 
environmental pollution, including noise. Furthermore, the land near and 
underneath the viaduct forms a stretch of “no man’s land” that cuts across the 
middle of the city through viable and valuable real estate. The three-quarter-mile 
viaduct, constructed in 1965, also accounts for “a significant amount of regional 
congestion” which any resident will agree commonly reaches levels usually 
evident in cities of far greater size (Painter 3). A 2010 study determined that 
even with substantial improvements in public transportation, the viaduct would 
still face increasing transportation demand, and that consequently the viaduct 
should be replaced and improved rather than simply repaired (Painter 46-51).
 Given that the viaduct corridor should be improved, the question becomes 
how to improve the structure to more efficiently move traffic and to better 
integrate the roadway into its urban surroundings. In doing so, it helps to look 
at a similar case in Boston, MA. Before the famed “Big Dig” project that turned 
I-93 into a tunneled highway, the city had built the infamous I-93 viaduct 
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(Painter 11-13). This structure carried 190,000 vehicles per day and inundated 
the surrounding environment with noise and exhaust pollution. Furthermore, 
its construction completely destroyed Boston’s West End neighborhood. While 
the West End was deemed a blighted and impoverished neighborhood, it was a 
relatively safe and tightly knit community; the viaduct, therefore, erased a city 
district with a strong definition of place. There are many similarities between 
the Boston Viaduct and Hartford’s. The I-84 viaduct carries 175,000 vehicles 
per-day, and serves as a barrier between neighborhoods in Hartford, essentially 
eliminating any potential “midtown” district in the city’s western half (Painter 
11). Plus, as previously stated, the viaduct creates tremendous amounts of 
environmental problems.
 Boston’s response to its own viaduct problems was to bury the entire highway 
within the city limits in a now infamous project known as the “Big Dig.” The 
project, while fraught with corruption and cost issues, did in fact successfully 
divert traffic below the city. Consequently, Boston was able to construct a series 
of parks, homes and business buildings in the space where the viaduct once 
stood. A 2010 viaduct study determined that Hartford’s best option was to 
undertake a similar project, but on a lesser scale (Painter 46-51). While Boston’s 
size and wealth allowed for the entire section of roadway to be buried, Hartford 
has little political pull, especially at the federal level, and even fewer funds. 
Consequently, the city would have to execute a hybrid project in order to save 
costs. The proposal advocated by the study included a partial tunnel underneath 
the area between Asylum Street and the Armory, exiting past Union Station 
and continuing as an at-grade/sunken roadway for the remainder of the former 
viaduct stretch (Painter 38-41).1 The proposed improvements would not only 
allow for large plots of valuable land to be reclaimed in the Asylum Street and 
Union Station areas but would also shorten exit ramps at the Sisson, Sigourney 
and Broad Street exits. Additionally, the project would enable the North End 
to be reunited with the rest of the city by improving visual and pedestrian 
experiences (Painter 38-41). In terms of the proposal’s integration with its urban 
surroundings, the study gave it a “Good/Very Good” grade, citing possible 
mixed-use development projects on reclaimed lands at the aforementioned 
sites, lower noise levels, and improved visual and pedestrian experiences on the 
north/south streets that formerly cut underneath the viaduct through the “no 
man’s land areas” (Painter 38-41). In addition, the study gave the plan a “Very 
Good” economic assessment, as it would provide more land for future projects 
and would better integrate the downtown area with the rest of Hartford (Painter 
38-41). Most importantly to policy actors, the surveyors’ calculations state that 
this particular set of improvements would cost about the same as it would to just 
replace the extant decaying viaduct (Painter 38-41). This proposal offers a more 
balanced, beneficial and cost-effective solution.
 Another important aspect of any plans to improve the viaduct section of 
I-84 is how it integrates with surrounding neighborhoods and communities. 
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One of the biggest problems with both Boston and Hartford’s viaducts were 
how they detrimentally affected and/or destroyed particular neighborhoods 
– mostly poor ones – in each city (Painter 11-13). Too often, infrastructure 
planners draw the lines wherever they see fit without taking into full account 
the impacts such projects will have at the local level. As such, there should be 
tremendous input from community groups in the planning stages of Hartford’s 
project, as advocated by the 2010 viaduct study. Since its initial construction, 
neighborhood groups in Hartford’s North End have criticized how the viaduct 
cut off the city’s poorest and predominantly African American districts from the 
prosperous downtown and what was – at the time of the viaduct’s construction 
– a relatively white section of the city to the south. In addition, there are 
significant avenues for housing advocates to impact how the land reclaimed by 
this project is used so that the city’s housing stock is improved in both efficient 
and equitable manners. For instance, if mixed-use development is the route 
the city should take when developing reclaimed lands, advocates at the local 
level should insure it remains truly mixed with regard to function (commercial/
residential) and accessibility for diverse socioeconomic and ethnoracial groups. 
Any improvements, therefore, should be vetted by neighborhood groups in the 
affected areas so that policymakers can avoid the same mistakes they made in the 
Interstate Highway era in cities like New York, Boston, Hartford, and countless 
other urban landscapes.2 When it comes time to improve the National Highway 
system, policy actors need to make sure they draw the lines so as to minimize the 
impact their concrete chokeholds will have on surrounding communities. 
Ring Roads and the Hartford Metropolitan Area3
In looking at transportation infrastructure in the Hartford metropolitan area, 
political fragmentation, Connecticut’s use of “home rule” for municipalities, 
and the subsequent lack of county governments have produced a unique 
phenomenon for a city with more than 100,000 people lying at the intersection 
of two major thru-traffic corridors. It is particularly evident when examining 
a road atlas of the city that Hartford lacks the “ring roads” typical of most 
American cities in similar situations. Because surrounding suburbs consistently 
block the funding and the placement of ring roads through their territory, traffic 
moving from Waterbury to Boston, for instance, must travel directly through 
downtown Hartford. This is the only viable option for the Hartford area, but 
other regional cities have alternate routes. For example, if one wanted to travel 
from Framingham, MA, to Portsmouth, NH, without having to travel through 
the Massachusetts Turnpike (I-90) and transfer to I-95 in downtown Boston, 
the person could avoid the heavily congested city center by taking I-495 (a 
beltway running from Cape Cod to I-95 in Amesbury, MA), or even MA-128 
(a state route and one of the nation’s first ring roads) around Boston to points 
north. Because Boston has ring roads, the majority of thru-traffic finds it far 
more efficient to travel around the city. In contrast, Hartford’s thru-traffic 
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seeking to interchange from I-91 to I-84, or vice versa, must travel directly 
through downtown Hartford, mingling with existing inter-city and inter-metro 
area traffic. 
 As with the I-84 viaduct, it is useful here to do a comparative study of 
highway systems in various cities of similar size to Hartford. Each year, the Texas 
Transportation Institute publishes its “Annual Roadway Congestion Index,” a 
table of 85 cities and an index of their yearly amount of time lost to congestion. 
The cities are listed by size categories, and Hartford is in the “Medium” category 
(TTI). Choosing the best test cases from the medium category, Richmond, VA, 
Toledo, OH, and Albany, NY, were selected. Each city has a beltway system 
that Hartford lacks, and consequently, each city had lower levels of congestion 
(TTI). Each city also was a part of highway corridors with large amounts of 
both local and thru-traffic, just like Hartford. The congestion indexes and 
populations are listed in the table below.
Table 1:  Comparing similar cities with ring roads versus Hartford with regard to traffic 
congestion levels. Sources: Wolfram Alpha (population data), Texas Transportation 
Institute Index (traffic data).
After examining the data, it is absolutely clear that cities with ring roads, even 
ones with larger urban and metropolitan area populations, have lower congestion 
levels than Hartford. The results are logical because ring roads allow for more 
efficient transportation for several types of travelers. First of all, ring roads bring 
limited-access roadways to the suburbs, decreasing congestion on “secondary” 
roads like the Berlin Turnpike (CT-15) for southern suburbs or US-5 in East 
Hartford. This increases efficiency and decreases the time it takes to go from one 
suburb to another or to move throughout one suburb. Secondly, beltways allow 
thru-traffic to pass around rather than through the center of the city, especially 
during peak hours. It would be quicker to go from Waterbury to the Bradley 
International Airport in East Granby by traveling on a ring road connecting I-84 
and I-91 northwest of the city as opposed to traveling to downtown Hartford, 
transferring to I-91 and then traveling northward. The beltway would be the 
more efficient option, but Connecticut’s reliance on home rule for suburbs means 
that the state must undertake strong-arm measures to approve highway projects 
without their permission. As such, no such rings currently exist around Hartford, 
even though they do exist around cities of similar size, scope and function. 
City Ring road(s): City Pop. Metro Pop. 2006 2007
Hartford, CT I-291 (partial), CT-9 (partial),  124,775 1,196,000 0.96 0.97
 but no complete ring system
Albany, NY I-787, Berkshire Connector, NY-7 97,856 857,592 0.82 0.83
Richmond, VA I-295, VA-288, US-360, VA-2, 204,214 1,238,000 0.83 0.83
 VA-150
Toledo, OH I-280, I-90 (bypasses city), I-475, 287,208 672,220 0.87 0.84
 US-23
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It is not as if policy actors in the Hartford area, however, have been ignorant 
of the benefits of ring roads. In the initial era of interstate highway planning 
from the late fifties to the eighties, Hartford city planners drafted a map of 
ring roads and connecting highways that would have truly integrated the 
metropolitan area, lessened traffic in the city’s core, and improved the efficiency 
of automobile travel. Unfortunately, these proposed highways were abandoned 
either in the planning stage or during the early stages of construction due to lack 
of funding, political pressures – including suburban resistance – environmental 
concerns and the economic and population size declines that occurred with 
deindustrialization (Kurumi). The map of proposed highways (Figure 1) 
includes two highways of analytical importance for modern-day Hartford. The 
first is I-291, which currently exists as a connecting road that allows suburbanites 
living north of Hartford to travel to the Buckland Hills Mall in Manchester and 
to points east along I-84 and I-384 without going through downtown Hartford. 
The highway was initially planned as the northern section of Hartford’s ring: 
it would have gone from I-84 just north of where CT-9 now runs south of 
Figure 1:  Map of Original Proposed Highwy System (Kurumi). I-491, I-291 (in its fully planned 
state) would have formed a complete outer ring system and the combination of 
I-484, I-284, CT-189, CT-2 and old CT-9 would have formed an inner ring system. This 
1960’s-era proposal anticipated a metropolitan area with 2 million people (currently 
it is less than 1.2 million). The plan suffered from population, environmental, usage 
and integration concerns (this is a classic example of drawing the lines with regard 
to space but not place).
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I-84 and would have intersected I-91 on the other side of modern-day I-291 
(Kurumi). It would have allowed residents in towns like Farmington to travel to 
in and around the region without adding to the traffic in downtown Hartford. 
In addition, I-291 would have traveled south to intersect I-91 in Rocky Hill, 
CT, allowing for transitions to points south as well. The second road of focus is 
the I-491 proposal, which would have been a two-part improvement allowing 
suburbanites from, for instance, Berlin to travel to Manchester and Vernon 
without moving through downtown (Kurumi). Similarly, the southern portion 
of I-291 would have allowed these same travelers to move to points east with 
the same ease.
 In modern-day Hartford, these roads would have formed a clear system of 
four quarter-rings that would have fully integrated the metropolitan area and 
reduced traffic at the city’s center by diverting thru-traffic and circumferential 
traffic out of the chronically congested downtown. The original highways plans 
abandoned due to lack of funding, changes in planning designs and suburban 
pressures, including the fact that some portions of the highway would have cut 
through existing suburban and urban neighborhoods (Kurumi). Furthermore, 
in response to the cancellation of these projects, Hartford and the state of 
Connecticut formed a system of unconnected partial rings that serve limited 
traveling purposes and complicate any future plans to form a fully integrated 
beltway system. For instance, after the cancellation of I-291’s southern and 
western portion, CT-9, which was designed as an inner-ring road, became 
the city’s southwestern quarter-ring, traveling just south of the planned route 
for that segment of I-291. In addition, after I-491 was cancelled, the state 
constructed CT-3 and the Putnam Bridge, which was part of the I-491 corridor, 
to direct some of the traffic through a partial southeastern quarter-ring corridor 
(Kurumi). This segment, however, does not extend to I-84 at a point far 
enough eastward for it to really have any beneficial impact on the city’s central 
congestion issues. As for the northwestern quarter-ring segment, the cancellation 
of that part of I-291 did not lead to any semblance of a ring road. As such, a 
firm wishing to move freight from New Britain to the airport still has to travel 
through downtown Hartford, or take back roads like Mountain Road and 
CT-218 up to I-91, a lengthy and inefficient process. The current ring road 
system in Hartford only covers two of the four quarter-rings that the city needs. 
I-291 fills the northeastern corridor and CT-9 covers the southeastern corridor 
that would have been covered by I-291 as originally planned. In addition, CT-3 
and the Putnam Bridge form the beginning of a southeastern corridor, but it is 
far from being a complete beltway.
 Because of the cancellation of past projects, it is important that policymakers 
look at why and how these projects were not completed, and how the partial 
projects impact future plans. As mentioned in the previous section, it is 
important for planners to examine where they want to draw lines for future ring 
roads so that they minimize the impact these tremendous structures have on the 
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surrounding landscapes and neighborhoods. After examining the neighborhoods 
and land tracts where the two remaining beltways should be constructed (the 
northwest and southeast quarter-ring corridors), it is easy to see why some 
initial road plans were abandoned. The southeastern corridor, as originally 
drawn-up, would have cut right through the quiet, family-oriented Oak Street 
neighborhood of Forbes Village, destroying a quaint suburban community. As 
had occurred in Boston with the upheaval of the West End, the planned I-491 
would have destroyed a great community with a strong sense of place. Rather 
than simply abandon the project however, policymakers should have looked for 
better options. Just east of the planned Oak Street corridor is a large expanse of 
vacant land at the border of East Hartford and Manchester that mostly contains 
large-scale power lines typical of inter-municipal tracts of land in the state. 
Clearly, a limited-access highway could be constructed so as to take advantage 
of this relatively empty land and successfully incorporate the power lines. By 
extending CT-3 past its current terminus at CT-2, moving it south of Griswold 
Street, past Oak Street and into the vacant land between Oak Street in East 
Hartford and Hillstown Road in Manchester, planners could have built I-491 
without destroying the entire neighborhood northwest of the Oak/Griswold 
corridor. Furthermore, this project – an extension of CT-3 to I-84 at the 
I-291/I-84/I-384 interchanges – would form the southeastern quarter-ring that 
was the abandoned I-491 project (see Figure 3). Therefore, it would allow for 
the more efficient movement of goods and people through the region without 
the use of crowded downtown roads or the crowded CT-2 while minimizing the 
new highway’s impact on the surrounding area. 
 Looking at the northwestern quarter-ring, the planned I-291 extension would 
have been placed near what is today CT-218: Cottage Grove Road (see Figure 
2). A four-lane road now serves this area, and a highway cannot be constructed 
in its current place without first acquiring significant funding and then solving 
integration and destruction issues. Furthermore, building a highway south of 
CT-218 would cut through Matianuck State Park, two country clubs, and the 
suburban campuses of Cigna and MetLife. After an examination of the area 
north of CT-218 however, it was determined that ample space exists in the area 
just north of CT-178, around the insurance companies, and far enough around 
Hartford’s six reservoirs cutting vertically through the most eastern portions of 
Farmington (Figure 3). These tracts are ripe for highway placement because 
they are mostly vacant tracts of land that are not already parkland and would 
be inexpensive to claim using eminent domain. Furthermore, by cutting far 
enough west of the reservoirs into Farmington, planners can avoid tainting the 
city’s water supply with the environmental runoff from the freeway. As such, 
policymakers and planners should advocate a new I-291 extension traveling 
from the CT-178/I-91 interchange around the CT-218 corridor, around the 
reservoirs and interchanging with I-84 near where CT-9 already intersects I-84. 
Furthermore, should this project be completed, there is the potential for CT-9 
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Figure 2:
Only CT-9 
and I-291 
exist as 
ring roads 
in the 
traditional 
sense. 
They only 
capture 
two of the 
necessary 
four quar-
ter-rings 
to fully 
integrate 
the met-
ropolitan 
highways.
Figure 3:  Proposed I-291 and CT-3 extensions fill the remaining two quarter-rings, integrating 
the metropolitan area while minimizing neighborhood and environmental impact. 
Extant I-291 and CT-9 (which intersects I-91 just south of this map in Berlin, CT) 
complete the ring system.
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to be upgraded to interstate status as an extension of I-291 close to how it was 
originally planned. Not only would this enable CT-9 to potentially receive 
federal funding, but this would also form the northwestern quarter-ring, and 
improve travel efficiency while limiting the environmental and community 
impact of the highway. Furthermore it would allow suburban commuters to 
access the gigantic MetLife and Cigna campuses at the intersection of Hall 
Boulevard and Cottage Grove Road via a limited access expressway.
 After examining the planned map of Hartford’s highways (Figure 1), the 
current layout (Figure 2) and the map including the beltways proposed in 
this paper (Figure 3), five key analytical points stand out. First of all, the 
original planners had great dreams in planning a full ring system (see Figure 
1); it would have been efficient, integrated the metro area and would have 
reduced downtown congestion. Secondly, it would also have cut through the 
existing suburban framework and would have had incredible communal and 
environmental concerns, something the planners failed to fully account for. 
Thirdly, the current map of Hartford shows that the existing highway system is 
incredibly inefficient through its lack of ring roads, a phenomenon that is the 
main cause of downtown congestion issues. In addition, the fourth point is that 
the current system only has two quarter-rings, but existing neighborhoods and 
highways will most likely prevent a fully integrated ring system from ever being 
implemented. The fifth and most important point is that the map of proposed 
highways cuts around existing neighborhoods and environmental danger zones 
and provides a full ring system in a manner that, quite frankly, is as good as 
Hartford can do given the current highway system, the existing neighborhoods, 
and the reality that it lacks the funding and political systems necessary to draw 
and implement the same system in the first map. Therefore, policy actors should 
follow the proposed highways in the third map when it comes time for Hartford 
to plan cost-effective, efficient ring roads that would have minimal impacts on 
neighborhoods and the local environment.
Conclusion
The last great public works project in the United States, the 41,000 miles 
of interstate highways authorized through the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 
1956 and its subsequent reauthorizations, are beginning to rapidly age.  In 
the very near future, the decaying state of the National Highway System and 
infrastructure across the United States will gain significant public focus, very 
likely – and unfortunately – through a tragic event such as another bridge 
collapse or, more hopefully, through a great piece of investigative journalism 
policy writing.  As this issue gains saliency, federal and state governments will 
have to appropriate the large amount of funds necessary to repair, improve and/
or replace parts of the National Highway System.  As such, policy actors at 
all three levels of government should prepare for infrastructure improvements 
by studying alternative policies and insuring that they take into account the 
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effects these projects will have on their surrounding environments.  Rather than 
wait for our infrastructural “day of reckoning,” planners should take necessary 
action now so that implementation can occur as soon as funds are appropriated, 
eliminating much of the post-funding planning that commonly delays an 
important process such as this.  In addition, policymakers should examine the 
potential costs of each alternative and weigh it against its effectiveness, costs, 
community impacts and environmental impacts in order to select the best 
option in each case.
 In the Hartford context, city officials need to work together with suburban 
officials and community groups with the goal of constructing a regionally 
integrated highway system.  Because of the state’s use of home rule, this has 
always been difficult, but given the congestion issues of downtown and the 
difficulty of suburb-to-suburb transportation, this issue has the potential 
to unite city and suburban officials to improve the metropolitan area’s 
infrastructure in a cooperative manner.  Furthermore, neighborhood and 
community groups can work with policymakers at local, state and federal levels 
to lessen the impact that infrastructure would have on surrounding metropolitan 
landscapes and neighborhoods.  After all, if localities come up with well-drawn 
plans that emphasize minimal local impact, it will integrate the region more than 
a top-down plan by federal officials could ever hope to accomplish.  In addition 
to building an efficient ring road system, Hartford needs to prepare plans to 
replace, repair and/or improve aging infrastructures like the Bulkeley Bridge and 
the I-84 viaduct.
 In the end, while funding today might not be sufficient for these plans to 
be implemented, the work done by policy actors now could lessen the temporal 
and fiscal costs of actual projects that will arise when necessary infrastructure 
funding is allocated in the near future.  It is time for planners to take a carpe 
diem approach to today’s infrastructure problems.  Rather than use funds to 
simply repair the nation’s aging highway system, policy actors should improve 
it in a manner that integrates automobile transportation into the urban fabric 
and makes traveling by car more efficient.  In the Hartford metropolitan area, 
this means replacing the I-84 viaduct with an at-grade highway and tunnel to 
improve its integration and efficiency, replacing the Bulkeley Bridge with a 
wider, more aesthetically pleasing and durable bridge, and working to complete 
and integrate the final two pieces of its beltway system.
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ENDNOTES
 1. At-grade: intersecting at the same vertical level. A four-way stop is an at-
grade intersection, while a highway overpass would be off-grade.
 2. See anything written about the infamous Robert Moses, but especially Jane 
Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities and The Power Broker 
by Robert A. Caro.
 3. All map data comes from GoogleMaps, which is cited in the bibliography.
